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Abstract
This paper evaluates the United States’ decision not to come to Austria’s aid prior
to and during the Anschluss of 12 March 1938. The uniqueness of this work is the twofront evaluation of both the internal/domestic affairs of the United States and the foreign
policy of the US Government vis-à-vis Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy. As this paper
will show, Anschluss might have been prevented, but at a cost neither the United States
nor European powers were willing to pay. The domestic situation in the United States
was too fragile, as was the lack of public support for war for FDR to have any leeway in
militarily aiding Austria. American, and to some degree European, opinion held that the
Austrian question was a European matter, and to that end American domestic policy
dominated foreign policy in hopes of reestablishing the United States economy prior to
attempting to aid anyone else.

Keywords: Anschluss, Austria, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Great Depression, Interwar
Diplomacy, U.S. Foreign Relations
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Introduction
It is the purpose of this work to try and understand why the United States did not come to
Austria’s aid prior to its annexation by the Germans on 12 March 1938. By examining both
the domestic and international fronts, and the political posturing therein, the reasons supporting
the United States’ course of action becomes clearer. The focus, then, is on the primacy of
domestic policies in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s thinking
To date there is no work, which addresses the United States’ position on the Anschluss in
such a way. It is my hope to prove that because of current American domestic situation
President Roosevelt’s options were extremely limited in the realm of foreign affairs.
FDR’s primary concern continued to be the Great Depression and its effects on the
country. His main goal in the early part of his first administration had been to halt the country’s
downward economic spiral. Roosevelt attempted to do this through the New Deal. It is only
because of the heavily Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress that President
Roosevelt’s New Deal acts could be passed so quickly, and with such little debate.
Another factor to be kept in mind as part of the domestic context of FDR’s foreign policy
formulation was the isolationist and pacifist sentiment in the United States. These groups had
significant influence on, at first, public opinion, and later on Congressional leaders. The work
done by these anti-war groups caused the passage of a series of Neutrality Acts, all aimed at
keeping the United States out of any war.
In the midst of both campaigning every two years and fighting to end the long economic
depression, Franklin Roosevelt was also attempting to modify the Supreme Court. Throughout
the 1930s FDR continually combated the United States Supreme Court, whose justices regularly
invalidated his New Deal acts. They left the President scrambling to alter what the court found
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unconstitutional. Subsequently, the President passed new laws that ideologically were similar to
the ones invalidated by the court. FDR wanted to alter the court so that his New Deal acts would
not continue to be invalidated due to the court’s conservative reading of the United States
Constitution. The main goal of the New Deal, however, was to hopefully put an end to the Great
Depression, and ultimately bring the country back on an economic upswing.
In analyzing the domestic situation some events will be given further in depth treatment
than others. For example, the economic theories behind the Great Depression will not be
covered in detail. The classic works of depression economists such as John Maynard Keynes,
Milton Friedman, and new scholarship by modern-day economists such as Ben Bernanke are
sufficient to provide an in-depth economic picture of the United States in the 1930s. 1 The New
Deal and the early years of FDR’s presidency have also been covered extensively by many
historians. 2 This paper will go into greater detail on these domestic events, because it is very
important to understand what legislation was being passed and invalidated, and what Roosevelt’s
passions were in trying to prop up the U.S. economy. It is this very passion that drove the
President’s domestic policy, and it is the reason why the domestic policy took precedence over
foreign affairs.
I also intend to show that more than enough justification can be found for the United
States to have come to Austria’s aid prior to the Anschluss. The correspondence between the
U.S. ambassadors and the U.S. State Department proves that as early as 1935, and perhaps even
earlier, many European powers correctly anticipated Germany’s aggressive moves both against
Austria as well as other Central European nations.
In analyzing U.S. foreign policy through the international context, it is important to
examine the diplomatic correspondence available, as Gerhard Weinberg notes that “American
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diplomats in the 1930s were often extremely well informed—even if the government in
Washington did little with their reports except file them.” Weinberg continues, “American
diplomats often obtained information difficult or impossible to obtain elsewhere…on such
matters as…the developments in Austria.” 3 It is also important to analyze the Anschluss by way
of the secondary scholarship. Works by young scholars such as Alexander Lassner and classic
works by scholars such as Alfred Low utilize the diplomatic traffic only available in foreign
languages, otherwise unavailable. Through both primary and secondary sources, a clear picture
emerges of not only the desperation of the Austrian situation, but also the diplomatic
acknowledgement of the existence of this tragedy. Both the archival and printed diplomatic
records also show that there is no excuse for some combination of the Western Powers (the
United States, Great Britain, and France) not opposing Nazi aggression and securing Austria’s
independence.
Domestic Policy: Depression & New Deal
In the United States, in the post-Versailles era, most Americans experienced prosperity
and were most concerned with tax relief and disarmament. In 1920 when Americans went to the
polls, they voiced their concerns and voted in Republican Warren G. Harding by an
unprecedented majority. Harding was an isolationist and against the Wilsonian vision of
collective security. He suggested instead the League of Nations a more loosely tied international
organization that would only meet when an aggressor threatened the peace. Harding offered
America an alternative to internationalist Wilsonian vision. 4 In America, the 1920s was a
decade of unheralded prosperity during which small scale internationalist movements began. No
American, however internationalist, wanted the United States to be pulled into another war;
although, as American diplomat George Messersmith would later point out, it would be better to
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“fight a small war now, than a catastrophic one later.” 5 Throughout the 1920s conferences were
called, movements were started and pacts were signed, all in the name of spending less on
defense and keeping the United States out of another war. There was a prevailing pacifist
sentiment in the United States.
The 1921 Washington Conference was called to limit the building of capital ships
(battleships and battle cruisers) for the three largest naval powers for a period of 10 years. The
conference established a building ratio of 5:5:3 and applied it to the three largest naval powers
(the United States, Great Britain, and Japan). The major achievement of this conference for the
United States was that the country achieved rough numerical naval equality with Great Britain
without an increase in naval spending. The conference also had the positive effect of ending the
1902 naval alliance between Great Britain and Japan, as well as continuing a U.S. open-door
policy with China. One weakness of the conference was that auxiliary ships (cruisers, destroyers
and submarines) were not included among the building ratios. Unfortunately, no governing
body, partisan or not, ever kept tabs on how many capital ships each country had built. 6
The 1920s also saw the rise of a new breed of pacifism led by secular, rather than
religious pacifist groups. These new “internationalist” pacifist groups often favored the
Wilsonian idea of collective security over isolationism or neutrality. 7 In 1921 a Chicago lawyer
named Salmon O. Levinson formed the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, whose
sole purpose was to “have war declared illegal under international law.” 8 A pacifist movement
also swept through the United States Congress in the 1920s, causing the proposal of several antiwar bills. For example, in 1922 Wisconsin Congressman Edward Voight proposed an
amendment that would have required a national referendum before Congress would have the
authorization to declare war, an idea that gained even more support in the late 1930s. 9 Likewise
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Senator Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota introduced an amendment to make war unconstitutional
in every Congress from 1926 until 1937. 10
One of the key symbolic anti-war events of the 1920s was the signing of a pact between
the United States and France, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Signed by U.S. Secretary of
State Frank B. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, this Pact called for its
signers to “renounce war as an instrument of national policy.” 11 However, Secretary Kellogg
was against committing the United States bilaterally to the agreement, so he invited all nations to
sign this Pact. On 27 August 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed by 14 nations, and within
another month virtually all nations had signed it. 12
Irrespective of such distinct anti-war feelings, Americans progressively became more
internationalist during the post World War I economic boom era, also known as the “Roaring
Twenties”. Such feelings did not last until the end of the decade; the United States became
fervently isolationist with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. 13
The depression lasted more or less from 1929 until the early 1940s, without private effort
or public intervention to fully revive the economy. 14 After the October 1929 stock market crash,
investments dropped by 87%. But the real impact of the Great Depression was not the price of
stocks, but rather the overall impact on the value of goods and services, unemployment, and pain
and suffering of the American people. 15
Occurring less than eight months into Herbert Hoover’s administration, the Great
Depression’s continued and ultimately led to Hoover’s defeat in his reelection bid in1932.
Hoover and the Republican conservatives believed that government should be non-intrusive in
economic affairs. Yet near the end of his term as President, Hoover favored two economic
government intervention acts which proved to be “too little, too late” as the depression worsened
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and the public grew weary of Hoover. The peak of the depression coincidentally was 1932, an
election year.
The depression doomed Hoover’s chance for reelection in 1932, and definitively shaped
his legacy. 16 Certain statistics, such as the suicide rate, public and private debt, and the business
failure rate reached their highest during the Hoover administration. Likewise, the value of
exports and imports reached its lowest during the Hoover administration. 17
In the campaign of 1932, Hoover’s challenger, New York Governor Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, pledged a balanced budget and a 25% cut of government spending, while he accused
the incumbent of “reckless and extravagant” spending. 18 During this campaign, FDR was
thought to be an internationalist due to his upbringing, although he largely dodged issues of
foreign policy and ultimately focused the campaign on the domestic situation. Favoring relief in
the form of works projects, the candidate FDR advocated that “aid must be extended [to the
unemployed] by the government.” 19 He acknowledged that under normal circumstances relief
for the poor was the responsibility of local government and private agencies, and “under no
circumstances [should] any actual money be paid in the form of a dole…by the local welfare
officer to any unemployed or his family.” FDR also stated that this type of aid was to be
temporary and not to be thought of as a permanent policy. 20 In the 1932 Presidential election,
most Americans seemingly wanted more change than the Republican Hoover offered them, but
not as much offered by the Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas. People wanted change, not a
revolution. Franklin Roosevelt was seemingly a good choice in 1932 because he stood for
change, but not a change in the status quo capitalism in America. 21 With 53.7% of the popular
vote, 22 carrying forty-two of forty-eight states, and 472 of 531 of the electoral votes, 23 Franklin
Roosevelt was elected president. Roosevelt began his term in March 1933 with the Democrats
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having gained control both the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 1932 elections. 24
The Democrats picked up ninety seats in the House, and thirteen seats in the Senate in the 1932
election. Seemingly, Roosevelt arrived in Washington with a mandate from the American
people. FDR had defeated an incumbent by one of the largest margins than by which any
incumbent had ever been beaten, and did so campaigning to help the “forgotten man at the
bottom of the economic pyramid.” 25 Shortly after being elected, in reference to the American
economic situation, FDR said, “it is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it
frankly and try another. But above all, try something.” Given President Hoover’s philosophies
on a non-government interventionist economy, and the resulting economic status of the country,
FDR had little choice but to “try something.” It is this type of thinking that laid the groundwork
for FDR’s New Deal. 26
Early in FDR’s administration, economist John Maynard Keynes proposed an idea to the
President about how to end the country’s depression. Keynes explained that during the early
days of the depression, investments dropped significantly leaving businessmen very wary of
investing. Driven by their lack of faith in the economy, businessmen made the decisions to
reduce manufacturing, which in turn produced layoffs. Thus, layoffs caused the unemployment
rate to increase. Keynes postulated that in this instance if “the private sector would not spend,
then the public sector must.” 27 Keynes argued that governmental deficit spending was necessary
specifically in this time, as raising taxes would not accomplish the desired goal of ending the
depression. Raising taxes would merely redistribute wealth, whereas deficit spending would put
new dollars into people’s pockets. FDR never directly adopted the Keynesian philosophy, and
was never prepared to spend the amount of money that Keynes suggested; however, FDR’s New
Deal programs were partially Keynesian on a more modest scale. 28
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Although the New Deal legislation dealt with nearly every economic activity of the
nation, it was not seen as an “economic revolution,” rather as a matter of necessity. 29 Although
FDR was primarily concerned with agriculture, and helping farmers, the New Deal also
addressed virtually every other aspect of life, such as: banking, housing, agriculture,
transportation, credit, insurance, etc. 30 FDR claimed that his New Deal sought to bring balance
“between agriculture and industry and balance between the wage earner, the employer and the
consumer.” “We seek also,” FDR said, “balance that our internal markets be kept rich and large,
and that our trade with other nations be increased on both sides of the ledger.” 31
The New Deal Acts reorganized, reformed and regulated the American economy.
Historians, however, have long debated the motivation for the New Deal programs, both the
administration of the funds as well as the benefits. Traditionalists such as William Leuchtenburg
and Arthur Schlesinger argue that the New Deal programs were administered to address the
needs of the country, while revisionists, such as Raymond Moley and Edgar Robinson, argued
that New Deal spending was dictated by politics. Both views seem to be correct, at least in part.
Politics did play a part in the distribution of New Deal monies, as some of the larger grants went
to politically important swing states; however, states with lower employment levels did receive a
proportionally higher number of large federal grants. 32
The New Deal contained some original ideas which partly benefited the country and
helped the economy recover, but none of the ideas actually ended the Great Depression.
Unemployment remained at 11.3% as late as 1939 (down from its 1933 high of 20.6%, but not
nearly the 3.2% of 1929), six years after FDR took office. 33 Because of the lingering depression,
FDR’s New Deal had its critics as well. FDR’s critics cited the weaknesses of the New Deal as
the absence of any steady strategy in boosting purchasing power or increasing private
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investments. 34 Roosevelt’s policies were considered to be “confusing and inconsistent” by some
and “illogical” by others. In hindsight, however, some modern economists, such as Milton
Friedman, have criticized some of FDR’s New Deal acts as having lengthened the depression,
and slowed economic growth. 35
In the early part of FDR’s first administration, economic policy and the New Deal were
of supreme importance, but were not the only noteworthy situations in need of addressing.
When FDR took office in March 1933, he was somewhat concerned about disarmament and the
lack of progress made at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. 36 President Roosevelt appointed
Norman H. Davis, a confidant of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to chair the American
delegation at Geneva. 37 In May 1933, Ambassador Norman Davis said in a speech at the
Geneva Conference that the United States was committed to reducing its armaments, as well as
not interfering with any League of Nations sanctions against aggressor nations. However,
shortly after Davis’ speech at Geneva, FDR agreed to support an amendment sponsored by
Hiram Johnson that called for an impartial embargo. 38 “The President’s failure to recognize that
his approval of the Johnson Amendment negated Ambassador Davis’ pledge at Geneva suggests
Roosevelt’s own overwhelming preoccupation with domestic issues at a time when crucial
domestic legislation was nearing final approval.” 39 This was a clear example that, Roosevelt
was more concerned with his New Deal programs than with foreign affairs; however, the issue of
impartial vs. discretionary embargos did not go away, and reappeared during the Neutrality Act
debates in 1935.
The national economy made modest gains during 1933 and 1934, but by the 1934midterm elections, none of FDR’s New Deal programs had significantly improved the economy
much more than Herbert Hoover’s programs had. The unemployment rate decreased more than
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8% in 1933 and by another 22% in 1934, and the economy was slowly showing signs of
recovery. 40 In 1933 the suicide rate decreased slightly, and the business failure rate decreased by
35%. In 1934 the suicide rate continued to decrease, as did the business failure rate.
Also, in 1934 the gross national product increased for the first time since 1929, and Americans
had more money to spend on recreation. Increased disposable income caused attendance at
baseball games to increase, and attendance at national monuments increased over 4000%. 41
Regardless of the slow recovery, the American people continued to have faith and
confidence that Roosevelt and the Democrats had a better plan for recovery than the
Republicans. In the midterm elections the Democrats picked up an additional nine seats in the
House and ten in the Senate, bringing the totals to ninety-nine seats gained in the House and
twenty-three gained in the Senate since 1932. 42
Meanwhile, in Asia the Japanese had begun to show bolder movements against the
Chinese; in Africa, Italy looked to expand its “empire” at the expense of Ethiopia. The League
of Nations’ inaction over these two issues caused a decline in the League’s prestige. With a
diminished League of Nations, and war looming on two continents now (Asia and Africa) the
United States’ growing isolationist movement began to pursue Congressional avenues to keep
America from entering a war. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated, “An avalanche of
isolationism was overwhelming any prospect of inducing the American people to agree to a more
vital share in world affairs.” 43 Professor Robert Dallek notes that by the mid 1930s Americans
generally agreed that the United States’ involvement in World War I was a mistake, and that
President Wilson’s executive freedom allowed it. Strict limitations on the President’s power
seemed to be the only way to prevent another war. In hopes or preventing future wars, and in
partial response to peace activists’ claims that the munitions industry sabotaged arms embargo
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efforts in Congress, and the idea that arms makers pushed the country into World War I,
Congress launched the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee to explore the arms and
munitions industries. 44
The Munitions Committee was chaired by Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota. Nye
was a progressive Senator who was selected for the committee in part because of his charge that
bankers and industrialists had pushed the U.S. into World War I. The Nye Committee set out to
prove that the munitions industry, “unless curbed by the government, was likely to involve the
United States in foreign wars.” 45 The committee was extremely isolationist and thought that
peace would be best achieved by “staying home and remaining neutral.” 46 In essence the
committee’s role was two-fold, both trying to uncover the causes of American entry into the First
World War, and to prevent its involvement in a later war.
The committee found that the munitions industry did partly influence the country to go to
war, and in March 1935 President Roosevelt met with Senator Nye about the prospect of drafting
neutrality legislation based on the findings of the committee. 47 Within three weeks of FDR’s
meeting with the Nye Committee, two House Resolutions and two Senate Resolutions (one
sponsored by Senator Nye) were introduced into Congress. However well-intentioned this
committee was, the overall effect of the Nye Committee’s findings was to “throw the country
into the deepest isolationism at the very moment when [U.S.] influence was so vitally needed to
help ward off the approaching threats of war abroad.” 48 This stance proved to be detrimental to
the survival of the Austrian state. 49
Due to the escalating situation between the Italians and the Ethiopians, Congressional
leaders desired to pass legislation before the end of the 1935 session. For this same reason
Secretary Hull was trying to delay the Nye Committee hearings, delay neutrality legislation, and
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delay the State Department giving an “official position” on neutrality. 50 While Congress was
debating several versions of neutrality legislation, President Roosevelt’s New Deal was dealt a
severe blow when on “Black Monday,” the Supreme Court ruled three of the New Deal acts as
unconstitutional. This was an unexpected move by the Court because judicial nullification was a
seldom-used practice in U.S. history. 51
By late August, a neutrality bill sponsored by Key Pittman (D-NV), Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, passed the Senate. A unified State Department voice of Secretary
Hull and Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore tried to lobby the president to kill the Pittman bill,
which called for an impartial embargo. 52 FDR refused to veto the bill in fear of disrupting the
ten pieces of pending domestic policy legislation [again showing FDR’s deference to domestic
politics], some of which were in direct response to the court’s “Black Monday” invalidations.
Roosevelt agreed to the impartial embargo if the act expired in six months and if the President
was given leeway in defining the “arms, ammunition and other implements of war” that the
legislation indicated were to be embargoed. Soon after, the amended bill passed the House and
the following day passed the Senate. 53
The Neutrality Act based on the Nye committee’s findings was passed in August 1935.
The largest debate over the proposed neutrality legislation was whether the proposed embargo
should apply to all parties equally (an impartial embargo) or a discretionary embargo in which
the President would be able to choose to which nation or nations to apply the embargo. Pacifists
and Congressional leaders mostly supported an impartial embargo, although some thought an
impartial embargo did not go far enough. As Senator Nye put it, “my own belief is that a
complete embargo on all trade is the only absolute insurance against the United States being
drawn into another prolonged major war between great powers.” 54 The President favored
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collective security, 55 but was willing to acquiesce to a discretionary embargo so long as the
debate was not long and drawn out. 56 Roosevelt feared that a lengthy debate over neutrality
would interfere with the passage of his domestic programs, such as the Guffey Coal Act, which
was being debated concurrently. 57 The State Department was split over the embargo question:
Secretary Cordell Hull and Undersecretary William Phillips favored a discretionary embargo,
while Assistant Secretary Moore and Chief of Western European Affairs J. Pierrepont Moffat
favored an impartial embargo. 58 Secretary Hull actually opposed all neutrality legislation
because of the threat of war around the world, but like FDR, he was willing to acquiesce to the
more palatable discretionary embargo. 59 Public sentiment in the form of pacifists and church
groups favored collective security, and only half-heartedly supported any form of neutrality
legislation. 60 Many who originally favored the Wilsonian ideal of collective security abandoned
it in favor of neutrality due to the global situation and collective security’s growing unpopularity
with the American public. 61
The Neutrality Act of 1935 created a National Munitions Control Board headed by the
Secretary of State to “license and supervise all arms shipments [and prohibit] the carrying of
munitions in American ships either to belligerents or to neutrals for transshipment to
belligerents.” The act also stated that American citizens who traveled on belligerent ships did so
at their own risk. Congress adjourned on 26 August, and on 31 August 1935, FDR signed the
bill which was set to expire on 29 February 1936. Upon signing the act, Roosevelt issued a
statement indicating that the arms embargo might have the opposite effect and could possibly
drag the United States into a war. “History is filled with unforeseeable situations that call for
some flexibility of action.” 62 Roosevelt agreed to sign the Neutrality Act both because he was
hoping to gain concessions when it expired in six months, and because he was fearful of
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jeopardizing the passage of his New Deal programs. 63 The Neutrality Act passed on 31 August
was the first departure from traditional American neutrality. In the meantime, the Neutrality Act
(the nation’s new standard of neutrality) was quickly put to the test. 64
The world was abhorred to read in October 1935 about the fighting breaking out in
Ethiopia (also known as Abyssinia). The Ethiopians, infamously called by Emperor Haile
Selassie to bring their spears, were no match for the Italians and their modern weapons. Because
of the mismatch, Secretary of State Cordell Hull considered declaring neutrality to be
unnecessary, as the application would have been as blatantly anti-Italian. President Roosevelt,
on the other hand, thought it was important to warn Americans that a list would be published of
all American citizens traveling on belligerent ships to Italy or Ethiopia, as well as anyone who
exported essential raw materials (oil, steel, etc.) to either belligerent. FDR was later convinced
by his advisors that publishing such lists would be an unwise decision, so the President opted not
to follow through with his idea. 65 Shortly thereafter, on 5 October, Secretary Hull issued his
“moral embargo” which encouraged people not to trade the essential raw materials that make war
possible to either belligerent. 66 Trade of essential raw materials was not specifically addressed
by the Neutrality Act, so the government had no legal recourse, and could only suggest that
American businessmen not involve themselves in trading these “contraband” goods. 67
President Roosevelt ironically declared that he did not “believe that the American People
[would] wish for abnormally increased profits that temporarily might be secured by greatly
extending our trade in such materials; nor [would] they wish the struggles on the battlefield to be
prolonged because of profits…” FDR was proven wrong because despite these statements,
American trade with Italy in these essential raw materials dramatically increased in October
1935. Keep in mind that at this point in history the United States produced more than fifty
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percent of the world’s oil, and that oil was the most essential commodity shipped to Italy and its
war machine. Italy would have had great difficulty in replacing the oil supplied by the United
States. But much to President Roosevelt’s chagrin, the October 1935 oil exports to Italy were
shown to be twice as high as the normal level for October. 68
FDR could not deny that American oil was fueling Mussolini’s war machine; yet, despite
governmental warnings there had been significant increases in the export of oil, copper, scrap
iron and steel, as well as other materials. 69 In November 1935, the oil exports to Italy reached
three times their normal level. Hull’s “moral embargo” was an abysmal failure, seemingly
proving correct Senator Nye’s hypothesis that American businessmen favored profit over
peace. 70 The Ethiopian crisis served as a lesson to American policymakers that “arms and
munitions” were not the only things that drive a war, and that essential raw materials should have
been evaluated in any posture of keeping the United States out of a war. 71 With the 1935
Neutrality Act, set to expire on 29 February, 1936, the next Congress began with debates about a
new Neutrality Act.
Although the Ethiopian Crisis showed just how important the trade of raw materials was,
in late February 1936, when the Neutrality Act was set to expire, Congress decided after much
debate to extend the existing act with only minor changes. FDR had agreed back in August 1935
to the Neutrality Act in its original form, in hopes of gaining concessions with the act. With the
passage of the new Neutrality Act, FDR did not receive any of the concessions he first sought in
August 1935. 72
The changes integrated in the new legislation included that the President was obligated to
apply an embargo impartially to nations currently warring at the time of the passage of the
legislation, specifically worded to address the situations in Asia and Africa. Also added was a
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prohibition on loans to belligerents. 73 It was a disappointing setback for the President that his
provision to limit the trade of essential raw materials to belligerents was not included in the new
Neutrality extension. 74 The President was willing to accept the 1936 Neutrality Act “as is” due
to the upcoming election. He did not want neutrality to be an “anti-administration” issue, in the
upcoming election. The new act was set to expire 1 May 1937. 75
Shortly after the U.S. Congress renewed the Neutrality Act, in March 1936 the prestige of
the League of Nations further declined when Nazi Germany unilaterally remilitarized the
Rhineland. 76 This was Germany’s first move toward recapturing the territory lost by the Treaty
of Versailles. Although, Hull continued to press that “peace and strict neutrality… [were] the
cornerstone of American foreign policy,” historian Irwin Gellman notes that by this point
President Roosevelt saw war in Europe as inevitable. 77
However, in the United States, Franklin Roosevelt’s attention was not on the Rhineland
or war, it was on reelection. The President continued to be preoccupied by his reelection bid in
November 1936, and focused his campaign on the merits of his New Deal. 78
Also, in mid-1936 Sumner Welles became the new Under Secretary of State, replacing
William Phillips (who became the new U.S. Ambassador to Italy). Welles subsequently
reorganized the State Department, due to a cut in the department’s budget, which resulted in the
elimination of 40-50 positions. This reorganization coincided with President Roosevelt recalling
several Ambassadors to European nations to aid in the President’s 1936 reelection bid. The State
Department prior to the mid-1936 cuts was barely able to process the foreign correspondence,
and after the cuts the department suffered even more. 79
Shortly after President Roosevelt’s landslide reelection, the Supreme Court, for a change,
gave a favorable ruling to the President. In U.S. v Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland, speaking
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for the Court, ruled that the President has superior power, above all others, in the case of foreign
affairs. The President, the court said, had better chance of knowing the actual conditions in
foreign countries, and he is often privy to information that others are not. Foreign affairs are
often based upon this secret knowledge, the release of which may be detrimental to the situation.
The court went on to say that in foreign affairs, legislation “must often accord to the President a
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.” 80 This ruling strengthened the President’s position from which
he tried to direct foreign policy. Coming off a massive victory and on the heels of the Supreme
Court’s favorable ruling, in late December 1936 Roosevelt asked Congress for permanent
neutrality legislation. Unfortunately, the President’s request would be delayed due to the civil
war in Spain. 81
Since the 1936 Neutrality Act did not specifically cover civil wars, Secretary of State
Hull issued another “moral embargo.” However, in late December several individuals applied
for permission to export airplanes to the Spanish Government (over the moral embargo).
Roosevelt denounced this request as “legal but unpatriotic,” as the U.S. government could legally
take no action since exportation was lawful. Naturally, this action stirred the government to
begin considering legislation to address nations involved in a civil war. Ironically, much of the
aid sent to the Republican Government of Spain in violation of the moral embargo ended up in
the hands of Franco’s rebel forces. 82 Professor and historian Robert Divine has noted that this
episode caused FDR to realize that had he “possessed broad discretionary powers he could have
dealt with the problem swiftly and efficiently,” and this began to change his mind with regard to
neutrality. He knew, however, that his will was not necessarily the will of the people due to a
January 1937 poll revealing that 69% of Americans favored Congress being responsible for the
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American Neutrality policy, and not the president. 83 Regardless of who dictated the neutrality
policy, the fact remained that the Spanish Civil War had revealed the shortcomings of the 1936
Neutrality Act, which made no provisions for civil wars. Rebel leader Francisco Franco
reportedly praised Roosevelt for the U.S. foreign policy stating that it was a gesture that the
rebels would never forget. 84
In early 1937, while debating a new Neutrality Act, Senator Nye, among others, felt that
the United States’ position of neutrality towards Spain should be reexamined due to Germany
and Italy’s quasi open-ended aid of Franco’s revolutionaries. Neutrality in this case actually was
helping the rebels. To make matters worse, news of conflicts pouring in from around the world
was so dreadful that both democrats and republicans were “beginning to look like bad
watchmen.” 85 Some, like Nye, wanted to extend the embargo to Germany and Italy, whereas
some favored lifting the embargo as to make materiel available to the Spanish government. 86
Probably the chief reason, however, why the United States was adamantly against aiding either
side in the Spanish conflict was the both non-interventionist stance of other European nations
such as Britain and France. Without addressing many of the concerns raised by Senator Nye and
others, on 1 May 1937, the day that the 1936 Neutrality Act expired, FDR signed a new
permanent Neutrality Act into law. 87 Because he was left with little discretionary power, FDR
announced in June, after the passage of the 1937 Neutrality Act that no change would be made in
the policy towards Spain. 88
The 1937 permanent Neutrality Act provided that whenever the president found to exist a
state of war between two nations or whenever a civil war existed which “endangered the peace”
of the United States, four major restrictions automatically took place:
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1. An embargo of arms, ammunition and implements of war (not including essential raw
materials) to all belligerents;
2. A ban on loans to belligerents;
3. A ban on arming merchant ships dealing with belligerents ;
4. A ban on American citizens traveling on belligerent ships.
The new Neutrality Act included a “cash-and-carry” portion that limited trade of goods to normal
pre-war levels” and that had a 2-year trial period after which the president could decide if it was
necessary. 89 Because of its cash-and-carry measure, the 1937 Neutrality Act favored both
aggressors such as Japan and sea powers such as Britain as both had the means to transport
goods from America. 90 This permanent attempt at neutrality legislation shows how difficult it
was to anticipate future world affairs. Each time a neutrality act was passed, a belligerent
inadvertently circumvented it, throwing the President and the Congress into a frenzy to try and
reconcile the legislation to current events.
In July-August 1937, Japan attacked China west of Peking, starting an informal
undeclared war, which prompted FDR not to apply the Neutrality Act. 91 It was determined by
the administration that the application of the Neutrality Act would greatly favor Japan who had a
Navy superior to the Chinese, and could take advantage of the cash-and-carry portion of the act.
Since Japan was decidedly the aggressor, and the United States had good relations with China,
President Roosevelt did not want to appear to be aiding one side over the other. 92
However, just as the U.S. economy was gaining momentum, all attention in the Roosevelt
Administration folded inward in late August 1937 when the economy hit a slump. Government
spending seemed to be the only thing keeping the economy going and in 1937 when Roosevelt
tried to cut spending, the economy suffered for it and FDR had become a “prisoner of his own
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spending policies.” 93 From August 1937 to May 1938 unemployment increased from 4,991,000
to 9,587,000. This economic downturn was nicknamed the “Roosevelt Recession.” 94
The recession of 1937-1938 was caused by a reduction of government spending, and was
counteracted by using Keynesian government spending policies. 95 In regards to the new
recession the New York Times in autumn 1937 said that, “the cause is attributed by some to
taxation… [and] by others to the demoralization of production caused by strikes.” 96 Journalist
and author Amity Shlaes adds that, “both the taxes and the strikes were the result of Roosevelt
policy.” 97 In 1939, the government tripled the deficit of 1938, which ended the recession but
only brought things back to “depression normal” and did not return the country to prosperity.
The FDR administration never spent the amount of money suggested by Keynes to pull the
country out of depression (5 to 10 times more was needed to be according to Keynes). 98 The
recession had such a profound effect on the country that when the Japanese attacked the U.S.S.
Panay in late 1937, killing two Americans and wounding fifty others, the outcry for war was nil.
Even at this event, some Americans pushed even harder for isolationism. 99
While the U.S. economy was backsliding, many still seemed to be unhappy with the 1937
permanent Neutrality Act. So many were dissatisfied that between the winter 1937 and spring
1938, more than 20 bills challenging the Neutrality Act were put forth in Congress. It was
obvious to both internationalists and isolationists that the situation that existed was favorable to
neither camp. 100 In early 1938, even Senator Nye proposed legislation that favored either a cashand-carry benefit for the Spanish loyalists, or lifting of the embargo for the Loyalists only and
keeping the embargo on the rebels. 101
From mid-1937 on, Franklin Roosevelt was reluctant to risk anything in the realm of
foreign affairs. Hugo Black, FDR’s nominee for the Supreme Court, was found to be a former
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member of the Ku Klux Klan (a white supremacist group); moreover, the “Roosevelt Recession”,
and the so called, “court-packing” crusade had made Roosevelt the most unpopular of his long
presidency. With so much controversy in domestic affairs, now was not the time for
controversial moves in foreign affairs. 102
Such is a brief overview of the complex domestic situation in the United States in the
1930s. President Roosevelt had his hands full simply with internal affairs and American politics.
But the global picture was significantly more complex and more convoluted than that of U.S.
domestic policy. With rising conflicts in Europe, Africa and Asia worldwide peace was being
threatened, and sooner or later the United States would be forced into action.
Foreign Policy: Austria & Anschluss
In the pre-World War II context, why was Austria so important and why should her
independence have mattered to the United States? Austria was important because it was the first
sovereign, independent nation that was overpowered by the Third Reich. In the
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or National Socialist German Workers Party
(hereinafter referred to as “Nazi”) era, Austria desired independence and autonomous freedom,
but did not have the ability to achieve it alone. Austria’s independence had to be guaranteed by
nations more powerful than the stripped and broken Österreich. Unfortunately, Austria could
never find an agreement that ensured its independence. The importance of Austrian
independence was crucial on the eve of a possible new war. Had the western powers been
agreeable to stop Hitler in 1938, World War II might have been averted. That may be
speculative, but the evidence that follows paints a picture that the Anschluss did not come as a
surprise; the Western powers did not need to sacrifice Austria and appease Hitler. The argument
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by some that Austria was “historically German” and ought to be included in the Deutsches Reich
(German Empire), lacks validity in light of the two countries’ distinctly separate histories.
When evaluating Austro-German relations, one must consider their history. From 1848
forward, many Austro-Germans thought of themselves as members of the German Nation (an
ethnic group characterized by a common language, geography, determination, beliefs and
character). 103 The First World War fortified the links between the Austrians and the Germans. 104
Yet, despite similar identities and common language, the cultural differences between the
Austrians and Germans were “substantial, and reasserted themselves quite independently of
Allied promptings in 1919,” as the two countries had already drifted apart prior to the end of
World War I. In fact Austria had not been part of Imperial Germany, and therefore Germany did
not “lose” Austria at Versailles. 105
After World War I, the victors drafted in Paris, a treaty of terms and boundaries for
Germany and Austria. The resultant Treaty of Versailles carved up Central Europe, and created
new artificial borders for Germany based on European security needs rather than nationalist
promptings. As a result, Germany was reduced in size and stripped of her colonies. Austrian
Chancellor Karl Renner, in going to St. Germain, told his people that he would get the best terms
possible for Austria. 106 Yet, there was little Renner could do as Austria was formally stripped of
most of the territories she had gained since the fourteenth century. 107 Included in these
territories was the Austrian South Tyrol. Although the majority of residents in the South Tyrol
spoke German, the Italians annexed it with little difficulty, establishing a new Italian-Austrian
border at the Brenner Pass. 108 The peacemakers in Paris arbitrarily created a host of smaller
states out of the former central Europeans monarchies, and as Georges Clemenceau, French
Prime Minister (1917-1920) dramatically put it, “Austria, that is what is left over.” 109
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Postwar Austria was in a desperate situation, as economic conditions were extremely
poor. Austria was, “a land without coal, one that was unable to produce sufficient foodstuffs”
within its own borders. To make matters worse, Austria had no major export industries, and
would have a difficult time at best existing independently. 110
Following World War I, Austria had no separate national identity other than a
Germanocentric view of the world. Many Austrians in all political camps viewed Anschluss as
the only solution to their many problems. Trying to evoke point number ten of President
Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”, the principle of self-determination, Austria moved
towards Anschluss, but was denied by the European powers. 111 In post-Versailles Austria, the
socialists were the first group to push for Anschluss. During the St. Germain talks Austrians
insisted on Anschluss; Germans felt that the terms of the peace treaty would be tougher on them
if they were pushing towards a union with Austria. 112
Due to overwhelming public opinion Germany and Austria signed an agreement that
called for a speedy unification. Austria would essentially be relegated to being a former
province, with Vienna becoming a “second German capital.” At least such an Anschluss
agreement would allow Austria to exist in a state other than destitute poverty. 113
Anschluss, however, was never a viable option as far as the four victorious powers
(United States, Britain, France and Italy) were concerned. Germany’s interpretation of Wilson’s
fourteen points argued that this violated the principle of self-determination, but the four powers
disagreed. The World War I victors correctly thought that Anschluss would lead to Germany’s
economic and political domination of Central Europe, the very preponderance that the victorious
powers were trying to prevent. Allowing Germany to annex Austria would place Germany on
the Brenner Pass, which the Italians strongly opposed, and Czechoslovakia feared being
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surrounded on three sides by Germany. Nor did any of the Balkan states wish to have Germany
on the Danube River, in a position to dominate Southeast Europe. 114 France was the staunchest
opponent of Anschluss as, “no French politician was prepared to permit vanquished Germany to
expand its territory and add some 6.5 million people to its population.” Especially considering
that Anschluss would have strengthened Germany beyond the power she had in 1914 (given that
Austria was more ethnically homogeneous and geographically more important than the outlying
parts of what was Imperial Germany). 115
In the early 1930s, while the United States was shifting to the left from the Republican
Hoover to the Democratic Roosevelt, Europe was shifting even more radically to the right. In
May 1932 Engelbert Dollfuss became Chancellor in Austria, and in January 1933 Adolf Hitler
became Chancellor in Germany. Shortly after Hitler’s Machtergreifung (seizure of power) or as
some have said Machterschleichung (sneaking into power), the Nazis won a plurality of the seats
in the Reichstag, the German Parliament. With the rise of Dollfuss in Austria and Hitler and the
Nazis in Germany, the mood in Austria shifted towards nationalism and away from Anschluss. 116
But the new Nazi German government favored Anschluss, more so than ever. Shortly
after the rise of the Nazis in Germany, homegrown Nazi terrorism began in Austria. Chancellor
Dollfuss reacted to these Nazi actions by banning all activities by the Nazi Party in Austria.
This, naturally, prompted even more terrorism by the Austrian Nazis. Dollfuss complained to
Britain, France, and Italy after having warned Germany to stop their support of subversive Nazi
actions and terrorism. Hitler's response to Dollfuss' complaint was that it was not a matter of
subversion, but rather of one German people. Hitler argued that the oneness of German people
could not be expected to subscribe to political lines, and that the actions of Austrian Nazis were
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due to the movement of Greater German people, not deliberate activities on behalf of one
country trying to overthrow another. 117
In retaliation, Dollfuss then revamped the state closer to an authoritarian/fascist model.
In exchange for agreeing to implement fascist policies Dollfuss received a promise of military
assistance from Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini, if the Nazis tried to force Anschluss. Dollfuss
then dissolved the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party, or SPÖ),
independent unions, and workers’ associations and seized all of their possessions. At this point
nearly two-thirds of the Austrian population was denied any voice in the Dollfuss government.
German Chancellor and Nazi leader Adolf Hitler was extremely displeased with Dollfuss’ antiGerman actions, and shortly thereafter the Austrian Nazis attempted a coup d’ètat. 118
The Nazis rocked the Austrian government on July 25, 1934 with the murder of
Chancellor Dollfuss during a failed putsch attempt. 119 In support of Austria, Italian leader
Benito Mussolini, also known as “Il Duce”, sent four army divisions to the Austrian border to
show his support for his fallen comrade Chancellor Dollfuss, and for Austrian independence. 120
Upon Dollfuss’ murder Kurt Schuschnigg, Dollfuss’ Minister of Justice, became Chancellor of
Austria. From his earliest days in office, Schuschnigg was clear in stating that maintaining
Austrian independence was of paramount importance. 121
Schuschnigg hoped that Austrian independence could be maintained by creating of an
“Austrian pact,” that would be guaranteed by Britain, France, and Italy. 122 Without Italy’s
support, Schuschnigg acknowledged that Austrian independence would be difficult to maintain.
This proved to be especially clear in 1935/36 when Mussolini embarked on colonial conquest in
Africa.
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In violation of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany revealed the existence of an air force
and plans to build a 550,000 man army. In response to this, FDR drafted a peace plan that called
for England, France, Italy, Poland, Belgium, Holland and possibly Russia to agree to blockade
Germany (thereby controlling all of Germany’s imports and exports). FDR would shortly
thereafter re-suggest this idea of a blockade to the participants at the Stresa Conference. 123
In mid-1935, just a few months after Germany’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles,
Mussolini and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval met in Rome to discuss several issues of
geopolitical importance to both Italy and France, one of which was the preservation of Austrian
independence. French Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Mussolini agreed in the “Rome Accords”
to consult if Austrian independence was threatened. The Austrian Chancellor was not satisfied
with this agreement because it did not include a provision for guaranteed military aid to Austria,
something Kurt Schuschnigg saw as vital to Austrian security. 124 Although the British approved
of the “Rome Accords,” after Laval agreed to grant Mussolini a “free hand” in Ethiopia, the
British withdrew their support. Shortly thereafter, upon hearing a rumor of an impending
German-Austrian alliance, Britain, France and Italy met at Stresa, Italy, to attempt to work out an
agreement to preserve Austrian independence. In the United States, President Roosevelt had
high hopes for the Stresa meeting. The President hoped that the three parties would agree and
partner with the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) so that a blockade of
Germany could be established that the United States could “officially recognize.” However, at
the Stresa Conference (also known as the “Stresa Front”) Britain refused to agree to defend
Austria under any circumstances. Britain’s refusal to defend Austria was caused in large part
due to Britain’s ongoing quarrel with Italy over the Duce’s colonial aspirations in Africa. 125
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In October 1935 shortly after the formation of the Stresa Front, Il Duce, suffering from a
bad case of imperial fever, invaded Ethiopia. Britain was very concerned over this aggression,
but not so much out of concern for the Ethiopian people rather because of Ethiopia’s strategical
importance. 126 Even before Ethiopia was defeated, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini seeing
himself as a modern-day Caesar, publicly expressed interest in expanding his empire north of
Ethiopia. The Duce, after his conquest of Ethiopia, had his sights set on the British controlled
countries Sudan and Egypt. He wanted his Italian empire to stretch from the Mediterranean Sea
to the Indian Ocean. 127 An Italian presence in Ethiopia was “too close for both British comfort”,
as London was worried about the security of its African colonies that bordered Ethiopia. 128
However, Britain knew that it could not afford to directly challenge Italy’s presence in Africa, as
it might push Italy closer to an alliance with Germany, which neither Britain nor France nor
Austria wanted. 129
Meanwhile in Central Europe Nazi Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, in violation of
the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. Although many were worried, including the Austrian
government which clearly understood this event to have lasting significance for Mitteleuropa,
none of the world powers reacted to Germany’s move into the Rhineland because it was formerly
and historically part of Greater Germany. The neutralized Rhineland was a unique creation of
Versailles, created within Germany, whereas Austria and Czechoslovakia were created as
independent. Because of the Rhineland’s history and political status, many expected German to
someday again reoccupy the Rhineland. However, after Germany abruptly remilitarized the
Rhineland world leaders pondered Germany’s next move. 130 Some felt Czechoslovakia would
be next on Hitler’s list of countries; others felt that Austria would be next. William Bullitt,

27

Ambassador to France (1936-1940) said that France would not fight for Czechoslovakia if they
had to fight Germany unilaterally. 131
After the Rhineland incident, in early 1936, Mussolini and Austrian Chancellor Kurt
Schuschnigg had a meeting in which Mussolini recommended to Schuschnigg that Austria
improve their relations with Germany because due to the strain on Italian resources as a result of
Mussolini’s Ethiopian adventure, they could no longer guarantee Austrian independence. Il
Duce suggested that Austria look to Germany to ensure their independence. 132 With the July 11,
1936 agreement with Nazi Germany, Kurt Schuschnigg tried to do just that.
The “July Agreement” as it has become known, was the first major event on the road to
Anschluss. In this agreement between Schuschnigg and Hitler, Austria agreed to give the
Austrian Nazis amnesty, to give the Austrian “national” opposition (the Nazis) cabinet
representation, and align the Austrian government closely with German foreign policy. In return
for all of these Austrian concessions, Germany agreed to recognize Austrian independence
(something that Adolf Hitler had refused to do up to this point). Austria saw this agreement as a
fixed basis of future policy between Austria and Germany. Germany saw this same agreement as
another step on the road to Anschluss. 133
George Messersmith, the U.S. ambassador to Austria (1934-1937), on the day of the
agreement between Austria and Germany, wrote a letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in
which Messersmith questioned Germany’s motives. Why, Messersmith postulated, would
Germany now recognize Austrian independence, when they had refused to do so prior to this?
He had no answer other than to speculate that it could be due to improving British-German
relations. Messersmith thought that in the long run the agreement would enslave Austria to
Germany. 134
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Earlier in 1936 Messersmith promoted the position that Germany’s natural economic
hinterland was Südosteuropa (Southeast Europe). This was a principal reason, he said, that it
made sense that Germany protested against any trade agreement among Southeastern European
countries. Germany wanted bilateral agreements with each of these countries individually.
Germany’s deliberate plan, which was in the making, involved running up large debts in
Southeast Europe and then paying them back with goods and not hard currency. This essentially
led these countries to becoming more economically dependent on Germany. Economic
dependence, in George Messersmith’s view, led to political dependence. Messersmith said that
German trade agreements were designed to help Germany and hurt everyone else. Only with a
favorable balance of trade could Germany continue to rearm. Without such a balance the Nazis
had no money for rearmament. 135
Soon after the July 11 Agreement, Schuschnigg speculated, “those who could still help
no longer deemed Austria worth saving.” Austria was a reminder to the West of postwar
mistakes in diplomacy. Some U.S. conservatives, ignorant of Pan-German history, argued that
Austria and Germany were historically and racially destined to become one state. After the July
11 Agreement, many of Austria’s supporters gave up hope. Messersmith predicted that the July
11 agreement had more to do with Italy and Germany than Austria and Germany. Messersmith
also said that Italy was still playing the field and was not committed to Germany just yet; some
would say that Messersmith was wrong on both accounts. In any event, European security was
maintained so long as Italy remained aligned with Britain and France. 136
Just as Europe was beginning to settle after the July 11 agreement, Civil War broke out in
Spain on July 17, 1936 (an event that made President Roosevelt even more skeptical of trying to
maintain European peace). 137 The United States was not really interested in the internal affairs
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of Spain or saving Spanish democracy; the real danger of the Spanish Civil War was its spillover
effect and the threat of a general European war. War in Spain ultimately pitted the National
government, and its supporters Russia, England and France against a group of rebels led by
General Francisco Franco and his allies Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Although it was
unknown at the time, the Spanish Civil War offered a glimpse of the future alliances that would
develop during World War II. 138
Since Germany and Italy were fighting on the same side, aiding Franco’s rebels, the
Western nations desiring peace (i.e. United States, Britain, and France) were careful not to act in
tandem and cement an alliance between Hitler and Mussolini, which might have led to
Anschluss. No one, except Germany, wanted Anschluss; so the United States, Britain and France
took the neutral road. Little did anyone know that Hitler was purposely withholding aid from
Franco in hopes of lengthening the Spanish conflict, and draw Italy closer to Germany and
further from the Western powers. 139
Italy also added to the push towards Anschluss, when in May 1936 Mussolini dismissed
his pro-Austrian Foreign Minister, Fulvio Suvich in favor of his son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano, who
was notoriously pro-German. 140 In October of the same year, Ciano visited Berlin where he
made agreements with the Germans that essentially abandoned Italian protection of the
Schuschnigg government and Austrian independence. Later, Ciano reaffirmed what Il Duce had
told Schuschnigg a few months earlier that Italy could no longer give them any material support
because of the resources needed to be sent to Spain; Ciano suggested that Austria turn to
Germany for further help. 141 Amazingly, in spite of Ciano’s actions, neither Schuschnigg nor the
other Austrian leaders counted Italy out of an “Austrian Pact” as many still saw Mussolini
through the “rose colored glasses of July 25, 1934.” 142 Within weeks, on November 1,
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Mussolini publicized an Italian-German agreement, the groundwork of which was laid during
Ciano’s October visit to Berlin. This agreement became known as the “Pact of Steel” or the
“Rome-Berlin Axis.” 143
The Rome-Berlin Axis was a settlement between Italy and Germany in which they agreed
to pursue joint diplomatic and economic policies in the Danubian region. This meant Italy’s
final abandonment of Austria. Both Italy and Germany agreed to openly aid Francisco Franco
and the rebels (Spanish Nationalists) in Spain. Additionally, the German government officially
recognized Mussolini’s conquest of Ethiopia. Global tensions were mounting in response to the
solidification of a formal alliance between Italy and Germany, and the seemingly impending
Anschluss. 144
In response to growing global tensions, President Roosevelt gave a speech on August 14,
1936 in Chautauqua, New York that quickly became known as the “I hate war” speech. FDR
stated that he hated war, and although the United States did not want war, the United States also
did not want to let war occur due to American passivity. The speech was important in that the
FDR wanted to show that the United States was not afraid of going to war if war was necessary.
It is doubtful that at this time President Roosevelt could have actually intervened because of both
the strong isolationist sentiment and close proximity to the November presidential election in the
United States, not to mention that at this point the U.S. military was not prepared for such action.
After FDR’s Chautauqua speech, warnings such as that of Emil Ludwig began to filtrate
into the State Department. Ludwig, a noted Jewish philosopher and rabbi espoused in a letter to
Cordell Hull a common view of the anticipated German plan for European domination. In his
letter Ludwig said that Germany would not settle for anything less than defeat of the West, and
that it was a mistake to believe that Germany would be satisfied by having colonies without
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having a war. “They don’t want land,” claimed Ludwig, “but the satisfaction of being victorious
over France.” 145 Ludwig added that the United States was the only country that Germany feared.
This fear was rooted in their defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1918. He made it clear that
“[isolationism] is the very thing the Germans [are] praying for.” 146
William Dodd, U.S. Ambassador to Germany (1933-1938), said in August 1936 that
Germany was resuming her normal position of importance in Europe, logically followed by the
collapse of the artificial Europe created by the Treaty of Versailles; Messersmith chimed in that
it was Germany’s goal to be the strongest nation on Earth. 147 As time progressed and it looked
more certain that Britain and France would do nothing to stop German posturing, Dodd indicated
there was a good chance that the Nazis were going to be able to dominate Europe without
fighting a war. 148
Shortly after FDR’s “I hate war” speech, and Dodd’s comments on the “rebirth” of
Germany, Hitler drafted what would become known as the “Four-Year Plan.” “Its significance
derives from the fact that Hitler hardly ever put pen to paper throughout his entire dictatorship,
but on this occasion the substance of his thoughts was sufficiently important to the future
development of Germany policy for him to set them down himself.” 149 In this plan, Hitler called
for a program of substantial militarization and the “unrestricted mobilization of the nation’s
economic resources to prepare for [an] apocalyptic struggle.” 150 This plan became the basis of
subsequent German military, economic, and foreign policy. 151
At the end of 1936, a tumultuous year in world politics, Commander-in Chief of the
Deutsche Luftwaffe (German Air Force), Hermann Göring after a secret meeting on the FourYear Plan, arrogantly told U.S. Ambassador to Germany William Dodd that the duty of the
German economic machine was to serve the interests of the whole German community, which

32

compelled universal obedience. He went on to say that Germany planned to rearm to the fullest
extent possible. Göring claimed that military self-sufficiency was paramount and he called
industry, workers, and the people to be “prepared for further sacrifice.” He also claimed that the
day would come for Austrians when they would consider it an honor to be given the Hitler
salute. 152 Comments such as these leave little to the imagination about the Nazis’ firm intentions
vis-à-vis Austria. But even at this point at the end of 1936 it was not too late to save Austria;
Germany still lacked the financial resources to militarily pursue Anschluss.
However, with President Roosevelt fresh off his big reelection victory, and confident in
his Supreme Court reorganization plan, the United States commander-in-chief was still resoundly
focused on domestic politics rather than war looming in Europe. To compound this, U.S.
Ambassador to Austria George Messersmith thought that his long awaited economic crisis had
finally hit Germany, and that the Nazis would not last throughout the year, as Germany was
running out of raw materials, and fast. 153 At the beginning of 1937 the FDR apparently had an
abundance of reasons to focus on the domestic agenda, and fewer reasons to concern himself
with Europe’s affairs.
Early in 1937 Mussolini formally abandoned the Stresa Front and later that year joined
the Anti-Comintern Pact. Some saw this as Italy’s formal abandonment of their support for an
independent Austria (although Italy’s informal abandonment of Austria began prior to July 11,
1936). 154 The desperate Austrian government, however, felt that Mussolini would always avoid
having Hitler at the Brenner, and Ambassador Dodd said that the Austrians felt that “Mussolini
[did] not intend to abandon Austria.” 155
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Although American diplomatic dispatches indicated that Italy was loyal to Austria, Yvon
Delbos, French Minister of Foreign Affairs (1936-1938) said that if German troops attacked
Czechoslovakia, France would fight; but if Austria were attacked, France would abstain.
Also, at this time Austria and Czechoslovakia were trying to reach an agreement, as their
fates were tied closely together. On this agreement, French Foreign Minister Delbos commented
in May 1937 that Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Austria combined could not stop
Germany militarily. Mussolini attempted to stop any agreement between Southeast European
states, as to not provoke a German attack. The Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Stefan Osusky
felt that Hitler would not attack Czechoslovakia until at least the spring of 1938, but admitted
that, as of the summer 1937, Austria could be attacked at any time. By this time both Austrian
Chancellor Schuschnigg and Czechoslovakian President Eduard Benes agreed that only through
the strong support of Britain, France and Italy could the independence of Southeast Europe be
preserved. 156
Franz von Papen, German Minister to Austria (1934-1938), whose job it was to
undermine Austria’s diplomatic position in Europe, showed considerable chutzpah when he went
to Paris to determine whether France would react more to an attack on Czechoslovakia or
Austria, echoing what the American diplomats reported. France informed Papen the French
would fight for Czechoslovakia, fulfilling the limits of their treaty obligations. Paris also said –
with less fervor – that they would view unfavorably any change in the international status of
Austria. 157 Germany seemed to be drawing close to a move against Austria, but Czechoslovakia
seemed to be under no immediate threat (which could explain French willingness to fight for
Czechoslovakia). French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos thought that only giving in to
Germany’s colonial desires would appease them (Austria and the Czech Sudetenland would not
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count as colonies because of their geographic position, adjacent to Germany, not to mention that
Germany already considered them quasi-part of the Deutsches Reich). 158
Truculent associates of Hitler continued to indicate future aggressive plans of action.
Göring revealed that German policy was now to incorporate all Germans into the Deutsches
Reich because they were now only separated by artificially boundaries created at the 1919 Paris
Peace Conference. Göring also said that an agreement between Austria, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia would cause Germany to go to war in Southeast Europe, as all Germans must be
united. Göring also indicated that Germany only had dreams of regaining what was lost at
Versailles. 159
In the United States around this time, Roosevelt gave a speech in Chicago on the SinoJapanese war that had been escalating for the past few months. Although hardly noticed in
Europe, FDR called for a global quarantine of aggressor nations, mostly by economic means. 160
Roosevelt said that when sickness ravaged a group of people, the community joined together in a
quarantine of the sick so that they may protect the health of those who are well against the spread
of illness. This was essentially the first sign of America’s willingness to directly address matters
abroad, although domestically Roosevelt continued to say that there had been no new
developments in U.S. foreign policy. 161
There was a big backlash in the United States over the “quarantine speech.” Secretary of
State Cordell Hull claimed that the speech set the United States back six months in changing
public opinion about involvement in world affairs. 162 In a fireside chat shortly after giving the
speech in Chicago, Roosevelt said, “Peace must affirmatively be reached for. It can not just be
wished for. It can not just be waited for.” 163 Roosevelt’s ideas of U.S. isolationism were slowly
changing, but official American foreign policy continued to be the same. 164
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On November 5, 1937, a few weeks after Roosevelt’s “quarantine speech” there was a
secret meeting of several high ranking Nazi officers about the future of German speaking people
in Europe. The minutes of that meeting, known as the “Hossbach Memorandum”, explained
Hitler’s concern that Germany’s future was dependent on solving the need for Lebensraum
(living space), food, and raw materials. The Führer’s plan to solve these problems was to
incorporate both Czechoslovakia and Austria into the Deutsches Reich. Although Hitler did not
see the Nazis situation as imminent in November 1937, he did speculate that he might be ready
to move as early as summer 1938. 165 Shortly after the meeting Göring outlined for Ambassador
William Bullitt the upcoming course of action for German foreign policy. Göring noted that
both Austrians and Sudeten Germans would soon be annexed. 166
With regards to Austria, at the end of 1937 many questions still existed with regards to
the future Anschluss. For example, U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt indicated that
based on conversations with Camille Chautemps, French Prime Minister (1937-1938), he
believed that Anschluss would lead to Italy turning against Germany. The British sent a secret
memorandum to Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State (1937-1943) in which the Viscount
Halifax, British Foreign Secretary (1938-1940), made the British position explicit that London
supported the status quo, but that sometimes the status quo changed. 167 Likewise, Neville
Chamberlain’s position on the matter was clear that Chamberlain “adamantly opposed a
powerful American presence in European Affairs.” 168
The first official shift in U.S. foreign policy and the first step in increased armaments
came in late December 1937. However, by the time President Roosevelt had decided to slowly
shift his views on foreign policy and become more proactive in Europe, it was essentially too late
to save Austria. 169 In a December letter from President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the House
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Appropriations Committee, Edward Taylor (D-CO), FDR explained that he had tried “every
conceivable” effort to stop the belligerents, but they refused to budge. Roosevelt acknowledged
that the world as a whole was rapidly increasing its armaments; to deny this was to deny fact. 170
He asked the Chairman to ask the Committee to consider new proposals for increased monies for
naval armaments. 171 However, many became suspicious of President Roosevelt and the motives
behind his request for rearmament. Some interpreted this request as a sign that the United States
was planning for an offensive attack. In concurrence with the message Secretary Hull said, “in
our foreign policy there is not any disposition or intent to engage in warfare.” 172
Approximately two weeks later, in his State of the Union address, Roosevelt indicated
that the United States had respected its treaties, but other countries had not. Those who had
shifted their governments from democracy had also shifted to abandon their international legal
commitments; in order for the United States to "command respect we must keep ourselves
adequately strong in self-defense.” These statements signaled the first public shift in foreign
policy, as FDR called the United States to begin arming itself in self-defense. 173
In early January 1938 Sumner Welles proposed a meeting on November 11 (Armistice
Day), upon the suggestion of the President that would have invited the international diplomatic
community to the White House. There FDR would make a plea for disarmament and economic
stability to prevent future wars. Secretary Hull was against this plan, but since Roosevelt favored
it, Welles was allowed to proceed. 174
Welles first attempted to contact British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden about his two
phased plan. Unfortunately Eden was on vacation, and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
received Welles’ plan. Chamberlain disregarded the plan because it conflicted with his own
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appeasement plan. Within one month of this event Eden resigned; within two months Austria
was annexed. 175
Guido Schmidt, Austrian Foreign Minister (1937-1938) admitted that he regretted Eden’s
resignation. Schmidt’s wishful thinking posited that Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy
was better than that of Eden, and thought that hope now existed of an Anglo-Italian
understanding that would bring peace to Central Europe. The Austrian government, Schmidt
said, planned to continue the struggle for an independent Austria, and confidence was increasing.
Encouraged by this, Neville Chamberlain requested that FDR hold back further proposals on
peace to see what his appeasement could accomplish. 176
Appeasement, in Chamberlain’s vision, meant to “settle differences by negotiation and
concession.” 177 Chamberlain’s appeasement policies have been debated vigorously by
historians. They have been called everything from a “shameful and bankrupt policy of surrender
to the dictator-states,” to a “rational strategy in the light of Britain’s weaknesses in the world by
the 1930s.” However, appeasement was this and more, argue British historians Paul Kennedy
and Talbot Imlay. They contend that appeasement had many phases and faces. The earlier
appeasement policies of 1936-1937 are though to have been the best policy given the state of
world affairs at that time. However, as the Second World War drew closer in 1938-1939, it
became apparent to some, not including Neville Chamberlain, that appeasement was a dead-end
policy. 178
Among the great powers there was much confusion in early 1938 as to which country
would be attacked first, Austria or Czechoslovakia; there was even more speculation about how
and when. According to Prentiss Gilbert, William Dodd’s successor as U.S. Ambassador to
Germany, no evidence existed in January 1938 that the Anschluss was imminent. Germany
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definitely wanted Austria included in the Deutsches Reich, but seemed to be pursuing a gradual
Anschluss. Prevailing opinion was that Italy did not want German troops on the Brenner border,
and therefore still did not favor Anschluss. 179 The United States later received even further
confirmation that the Italians were pro-Austrian. During a conversation with Italian Ambassador
to the United States Fulvio Suvich, Under Secretary Sumner Welles was informed that Germany
wanted colonies and monetary assistance, but had no ambitions in Central Europe, and especially
no designs on Austria. Suvich claimed that he was Austrian by birth and had helped Mussolini
respect Austria after the murder of Dollfuss in 1934. Suvich claimed that Austrian independence
was a cornerstone of Italian foreign policy, an obvious falsehood. 180
Realistically though, Germany had a different plan than what Suvich claimed. In early
February, Germany accused Austria of violating the 11 July 1936 agreement, to which Austria
responded that they had not violated the agreement and drew up a list of all the ways that
Germany had violated it. 181 This prompted the meeting on 12 February at Berchtesgaden
between Hitler and Schuschnigg. The February 1938 Berchtesgaden meeting was a turning point
in Hitler’s path to Anschluss. After the meeting Time magazine praised Schuschnigg for,
“yielding much without yielding Austria’s territorial integrity.” 182 However, a few nights after
the meeting, Schuschnigg revealed the truth to John C. Wiley, George Messersmith’s successor
as U.S. Ambassador to Austria, about his meeting in Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest. Schuschnigg said
that 12 February was the most horrible day of his life. “Hitler openly told him of his desire to
annex Austria, and declared that he could march into Austria with much greater ease and
infinitely less danger than he incurred in [the] remilitarization of the Rhineland,” Wiley reported.
After Berchtesgaden, France said they would have to confer with Britain as to whether or not
they would recommend Schuschnigg to accept or reject Hitler’s demands. Soon after the French

39

Foreign Minister told Schuschnigg that only a coalition of Britain, France, and Italy could save
Austria, reaffirming Austria’s long standing position vying for Western protection. 183
Schuschnigg gave Wiley the details of the meeting of Hitlerite brow-beating at
Berchtesgaden. Hitler had brought in three generals to Berchtesgaden to pressure the Austrian
Chancellor. Hitler made four demands: amnesty for all Austrian Nazis; the Nazis who lost
pensions and positions to be reinstated; Seyss-Inquart was to be appointed as Minister of the
Interior (and in charge of all police forces); and Austria was not allowed to make any moves with
regard to foreign affairs without first consulting Germany. Hitler told Schuschnigg that the goal
was to bring together 80 million Germans to dominate Europe. With respect to the agreement at
Berchtesgaden: amnesty was granted to Austrian Nazis and the Nazi pensions were reinstated;
Nazi positions were not. 184
Even after Berchtesgaden, Schuschnigg did not give up hope, even though at this point
FDR considered the soon to be Anschluss a fait accompli. 185 Schuschnigg told U.S. Ambassador
to Austria Wiley that he still wanted an independent Austria, but if Germany challenged Austria
militarily, then Schuschnigg would be forced to resign. In response, Wiley mistakenly told
Guido Schmidt that the United States urged Austria against any action which might be assumed
to threaten Austrian independence. In what was tantamount to scolding, Moffat chided Wiley,
“We certainly can’t be thought…to assume any responsibility legal or moral in Europe at the
moment…” 186 The only way to maintain Austrian independence, in Schuschnigg’s opinion, was
for Britain, France, and Italy to join together and support Austria; without such diplomatic
support Austria would never be safe. The Austrian Chancellor never seemed to consider U.S.
involvement in the securing of Austrian independence, as he seemingly considered it a European
matter. Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted that getting Britain, France, and Italy together would
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be difficult because Britain and France would be forced to recognize Italian conquest of
Ethiopia. Schuschnigg was doing everything in his power to buy more time, as he did in July
1936. 187
The Austrian Chancellor claimed to have confidence in his newly appointed Minister of
the Interior Arthur Seyss-Inquart (who was forced upon him at Berchtesgaden), and still vowed
to continue struggling for Austrian independence. Egon Berger-Waldenegg, Austrian
Ambassador to Italy, said that Seyss-Inquart was a loyal Austrian and glad to see July 11th
reaffirmed. 188 Meanwhile William Bullitt noted that he was told by an unnamed “intimate
associate” of Arthur Seyss-Inquart’s that the Austrian Minister of the Interior was 100% Nazi,
and would soon show his true colors. 189
The new U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, and noted anti-Nazi, George Messersmith sent
a long and fiery memorandum to Cordell Hull in which he discussed the February 12 meeting at
Berchtesgaden. Messersmith said that Hitler had made such stringent demands of Austria as to
leave them without real independence. Messersmith expressed his bewilderment about how
Britain could pursue appeasement with Germany given that Germany had never kept agreements
with anyone. Moreover, Hitler had spelled out his plan for Anschluss in his 1925 semiautobiographical work Mein Kampf. Yet British policy was focused more than ever on dead
agreements, complained Messersmith. Messersmith wrote that in his opinion, if Austria resisted
Anschluss, Schuschnigg might end up like Dollfuss. The Assistant Secretary had no doubt that
Anschluss was Germany’s goal; however, Hitler’s Wehrmacht (German Army) was not militarily
ready to go to war. Austria was all but lost unless France or Britain stood up and spoke out in
support of Austria. If Hitler was not to be confronted over Austria, Czechoslovakia was sure to
follow four-to-five months later. Messersmith correctly assumed that France would fight for
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Czechoslovakia in February, but would not come to its defense later. The Assistant Secretary
claimed that Anschluss would open the flood gates of European conquest to Germany because
there was no country in Northern or Southeastern Europe that could stop German advances. 190
Messersmith’s predictions were on the mark.
On February 20 Hitler gave a speech in which he both affirmed Austrian independence
and stated that over ten million Germans lived in states adjoining the borders of Deutschland, a
clear indicator that the Führer considered those ten million a least a de facto part of the
Deutsches Reich. 191 Shortly after Hitler’s speech France coincidentally recognized that a
German controlled Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania would be too powerful, and
that France would be destroyed within a few years. France contacted Britain in an attempt to
secure an agreement to aid Austria militarily if there was any change in the status quo. Britain
said they would agree only if Italy both joined the agreement, and pulled their support from
Franco’s rebels in Spain. Mussolini agreed to talk about both ventures with Britain and France,
but Britain still did not feel comfortable with the agreement so in the end three powers did not
reach an agreement to protect the independence of Austria.
Shortly before the Anschluss, Yvon Delbos said that because Britain had made it clear
they would do nothing to stop Austria’s annexation and since France did not have the military
power to stop Germany single-handedly, that the world had reached the stage where diplomacy
was dead and only force would prevail. French Prime Minister Eduard Daladier still claimed
that France would support Czechoslovakia if they were attacked, but he now considered Austria
a lost cause. 192
On March 9, Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite, where he
expected all Austrians to vote for a “free, German, independent, social, Christian Austria
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dedicated to peace.” The qualifications for voting were “all Austrian citizens, male and female
born earlier than 1915,” qualifications that eliminated most Nazis from voting. 193
Hitler went into rage over Schuschnigg’s proposed plebiscite, as it would have surely
meant defeat for Anschluss. Seyss-Inquart issued an ultimatum to Schuschnigg, on Hitler’s
directive, to cancel the plebiscite. Under threat of a Nazi instigated civil war, Schuschnigg
cancelled the plebiscite, so long as there would be no Nazi disturbances in Austria. Berlin
demanded that Schuschnigg must resign, and name Seyss-Inquart as his successor. 194
On the day Schuschnigg resigned, March 11, 1938, the New York Times wrote that the
United States planned to do nothing about Anschluss. J. Pierrepont Moffat, head of the Division
of European Affairs in the State Department, noted that the United States, “had no intention of
moving before the British and French, as in a purely European situation we did not wish to take
the lead.” 195 Hull said that Austria was opposed to German policy and that the proposed
plebiscite would have proven that. Dispatches from foreign governments had long forecasted the
Anschluss and American and European unwillingness to prevent it. 196 The next day, March 12,
when the Wehrmacht invaded and occupied Austria, Edgar L. G. Prochnik, Austrian Minister to
the United States received orders to raise the Nazi swastika flag over the Austrian embassy in
Washington. Moffat commented that this event made it clear to “Washingtonians that Austria
was no more.” 197
After the Anschluss, Schuschnigg said that up to March 14 the American press had been
in general pro-German. Only on this date did the media focus shift to Germany going after
smaller states, blatantly breaching agreements. 198 German lies and propaganda also began to run
wild after the Anschluss. Göring told Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to Germany (19371939), that German troops would withdraw from Austria as soon as order was restored (order
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was never lost!), and Austria would have a free election (which did not happen). Seyss-Inquart
also told Ambassador Wiley that Austria would remain independent after he formed a
government of “reasonable and moderate men,” which also never happened. André FrancoisPoncet, French Ambassador to Germany (1931-1938), assessed that the world had mistakenly
given-in to Hitler, and that the Führer’s desire for further land grabs had been merely aroused
further. 199
On March 16, four days after the Anschluss, Assistant Secretary of State, George
Messersmith let it be known to John C. Wiley, the U.S. Ambassador to Austria (1938), that there
would be no change in U.S. policy no matter what happened elsewhere. The next day Secretary
of State Cordell Hull gave a speech wherein he noted that, “Isolationism is not a means to
security; it is a fruitful source of insecurity,” echoing FDR’s thoughts that the United States
could not escape staying out of a European conflagration either through isolationism or
neutrality. Hull stressed in the speech the necessity of rearmament. To be isolationist now
would cost the United States its most valued possessions of freedom and liberty. 200
On April 6, 1938 the United States closed its embassy in Vienna and told Berlin that
Germany was now responsible for Austria’s debts in accordance with international law, a charge
which Hitler dismissed. The United States and the European powers accepted Anschluss either
de facto, de jure or both, and only Mexico ever formally denounced the German annexation of
Austria. 201
Conclusion
The United States quietly pulled out of Austria. Immediately after the Anschluss, FDR
had wanted to issue a strong response, but was talked out of it by the State Department. 202 That
the United States’ diplomatic relations with Austria ended without much ado about anything
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should come as no surprise, after American and Western inaction during Austria’s precipitate
slide toward Anschluss. Although Britain and France were blatant appeasers of Hitler, there is
little evidence that President Roosevelt saw the Anschluss as a way to quell the appetite of a
hungry dictator. 203
The Neutrality legislation in place in the United States severely limited FDR’s ability to
come to Austria’s rescue. So either because of, or in spite of neutrality legislation, Franklin
Roosevelt was so consumed with the domestic agenda that foreign affairs were forced to a
position of lesser importance. With the Depression in the United States easing after 1933 as
pointed out by economist Ben Bernanke, the American economic situation was improving, but at
a rate much too slow considering how much ground the United States lost between 1929 and
1933. 204 FDR’s New Deal, his answer for the Depression, was the President’s first priority. In
his own mind, Roosevelt needed to solve the economic crisis and then worry about foreign
affairs. His fights with the Supreme Court were a fight to keep his New Deal online; an agenda
which FDR thought were the key to bringing the country out of the depression.
Roosevelt’s philosophical stance on the guarantee of Austrian independence also played a
significant role in the United States’ ultimate inaction vis-à-vis Hitler’s Anschluss. FDR saw the
guarantee of Austrian independence as a purely European matter, not one in which the United
States should be involved. France would not militarily support Austria’s independence without
the aid of Britain, and Britain did not want to support Austria under any circumstance. So by
Franklin Roosevelt’s rationale, the United States had no business in Europe’s affairs, if the
European powers did not take matters into their own hands.
The United States had ample evidence to support the defense of Austria against Germany,
if not for the sake of saving Austria itself, than at least for maintaining the European balance of
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power and global security. However, regardless of the evidence for Austria needing support for
its survival, President Roosevelt did not aid Austrian independence due to his top priority in his
domestic agenda, namely the fights with Congress and the Supreme Court to see his New Deal
agenda come to fruition and pull the country out of the persistent economic depression. Through
his domestic actions and international inaction, FDR decided that since the domestic situation
was a mess, it was not prudent to try and solve the world’s problems. In hindsight, had the
United States been willing to go to war over the Anschluss, World War II might have never
occurred, but that is speculation at best.
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